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Is Cinema a Vessel for Empathy?: An Assessment of Audiences’ 
Active Inaction 
 Since the dawn of film screenings, questions of film’s legitimacy as an art and audiences’ 
levels of participation with it have been on the forefront of numerous theories regarding film 
reception. Regardless of whether or not viewers are active or inactive, what remains is a two-
part, deceptively convoluted question: Is it possible to garner new empathy by watching films, 
and can audiences be active and compassionate enough to enact their new wisdom onto the real 
world? Through comparing and contrasting the socio-political effects of film as well as the 
psychoanalytical theories of film itself, it is revealed that audiences not only identify with the 
screen because of its mirror-like qualities, but they also, through this association, have the 
potential to either absorb or neglect new ideological thought through film. This will be analyzed 
by synthesizing parts of Walter Benjamin’s and Stuart Hall’s theories on audience reception and 
apperception through a socio-political lens. Then, Christian Metz “The Imaginary Signifier” will 
pave the way for a psychoanalytical understanding of film reception and will, ideally, determine 
whether or not the act of viewing cinema reinforces spectators’ own egos as if the screen is a 
mirror. Real-world benefits of identification with a film will then be discussed in comparison to 
the viewer with “agency” that reframes the narrative to their own ideology. The point, though, 
where cinema can possibly entertain both window and mirror-like qualities for all audiences may 
prove to be the point of true cinematic empathy. In a scientific context — specifically robotics — 
empathy in soft machines is theorized to be found first through instilling vulnerability into the 
machine. This connotes that the soul of the machine (empathy) is formed through vulnerability. 
If the cinema applies the same by taking its gaze and making it vulnerable by flipping it on its 
head (morally/existentially speaking), then plausibly those stuck in their echo-chambers will, in a 
Benjamin sense, escape and be mobilized. 
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 Walter Benjamin in “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” and Stuart 
Hall in “Encoding/Decoding,” when synthesized,  provide decent frameworks in which film and 
television are not only coded with meaning but also dictate certain responses to that meaning. 
Walter Benjamin states, in essence, that art which has been mechanically reproduced then 
redistributed to wider audiences loses its “aura” (which belongs to the physical art) and instead 
gains a political element. Benjamin surfaces an opposing point from Duhamel who states that 
film is “a pastime for helots, a diversion for the uneducated, wretched” (qtd. in Durham 32). 
Benjamin concludes Duhamel’s assumption with the statement that “clearly this…[says] that the 
masses seek distraction whereas art demands concentration from the spectator” (32). Benjamin 
argues that this distraction may be more favourable for art via mechanical reproduction because 
if someone concentrates on a work of art, they are “absorbed” by it, whereas if the masses are 
distracted, it is a state of reception that allows for the absorption of the art into themselves (32). 
Distraction through art thus becomes apperception and can, according to Benjamin, mobilize the 
masses.  
 This, though, is operating under the assumption that the film’s encoded messages are 
received, decoded, then followed through into reality. Enter Stuart Hall, who establishes how 
media is encoded and decoded and the ways in which the audience responds to said media. Hall 
seeks to prove a cyclical nature with which ideological meaning is communicated. He first states 
that in order for something to become a communicative event, it “must become a “story’” (qtd. in 
Durham 164). Within these stories are encoded messages which must carry “meaningful 
discourse” in order to be “meaningfully decoded” (165). He then later dives into the televisual 
sign, with visual and aural discourse, that represents what it captures but cannot “be the referent 
or concept it symbolizes” (166). This is important because in order for something to be 
communicated through something only half-real, it must be encoded, hence the significance of 
stories and signifiers. Hall lists three ways in which these codes are then decoded by audiences: 
1) The dominant hegemonic position wherein the viewer is operating under the determined 
societal codes and interpreting meaning through them (169). Furthermore, producers in order to 
get this result assess what has been already encoded under the dominant hegemonic position and 
perpetuate that meaning; 2) the negotiated position. This position acknowledges dominant 
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hegemonic encoding in media but interprets and negotiates it under a more “corporate” position. 
Negotiated codes and the logic behind them are sustained by hegemonic encoding because of its 
particular and partial opposition (172); lastly is 3) the oppositional approach. This necessitates 
that the viewer decodes a message by denying and dismantling its framework, then re-framing it 
with entirely new foundations under their own ideologies (173). With these three positions in 
mind, and Benjamin’s point on viewers’ apperception of art, it is clear that through societal, 
hegemonic codes, viewers decode art in a way that corroborates with their own beliefs on a base 
level. While Hall’s concepts can and do manifest in several ways, both positively and negatively, 
what may be most intriguing of our times are the following questions: How do audiences decode 
meaning, assimilating it into themselves, and act upon this new framework in the real world, if 
they act at all? Essentially, how do people watch films, and how do they see reality?
Before establishing the real-world context, it is imperative to explore film 
psychoanalytical theory via Christian Metz. Taking from Jacques Lacan and Sigmund Freud, 
Metz in “The Imaginary Signifier” combines their approaches with the spectator’s identification 
with the screen. Metz explains that the Lacanian formation of the ego through identification with 
the self in the mirror allows for the absence of ourselves physically in a film, yet still for our 
identification with it. In essence, “what makes possible the spectator’s absence…is the fact that 
the spectator has already known the experience of the mirror [from childhood]…and is thus able 
to constitute a world of objects” without the spectator being present in the film (46). Metz then 
explores what a spectator specifically identifies with, and, more specifically, where the already 
existent ego of the spectator lies within a film. While an individual could identify with the 
experiences of a protagonist, or even their actor, this is not an umbrella means of identification 
for all. The ego, therefore, must be present somewhere else. Metz goes further, stating that the 
subject is all perceiving because there is no direct reflection of themselves with the objects on the 
screen. Therefore, “this mirror [the screen] returns us everything but ourselves, because we are 
wholly outside of it” while looking upon it (49). It is this looking, and the association with the 
camera lens, that creates the viewer as the signified in the cinematic experience. This voyeurism 
is also the placement of the ego, found in a series of mirrors from projector to screen to human 
eye. The position of being the “perceiver” rather than the “perceived” connotes a pleasure in 
seeing without being seen — in falling into the world of the imaginary without leaving the real 
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(54).  This ‘seeing' is further fleshed out into discussions of filmic idealism, voyeurism, and 
scopophilia, among other themes. With the aforementioned context of Hall’s decoding positions 
and Benjamin’s point on the apperception of mechanically reproduced art, it becomes clear that 
while cinema may not be a direct mirror in terms of subject and object, it is a reflection of what 
audiences desire to see unfold on screen. This desire is to either reinforce their own egos or fuel 
idealism through viewing film.
In modern times, there have been several studies conducted on the effects of film wherein 
the process of identification and/or voyeurism was shown to have either established empathy or 
reinforced narcissism, respectively. In “Film Involvement and Narrative Persuasion: The Role of 
Identification with the Characters” Juan-José Igartua, conducts several studies wherein he assess 
the significance of audiences’ identification with characters. This is broken down into several 
processes: 
 “a) Emotional empathy, the ability to feel what the characters feel and become affectively 
 involved…; b) cognitive empathy, adopting the point of view of or  putting oneself in the   
 place of the characters; c) becoming absorbed in the story… a temporal loss of self-   
 awareness and imagining the story as if one were one of the characters; and, d) personal   
 attraction to the characters…” (1). 
 These four points were found to ring true in tests, and, most notably, these tests found 
that films with socially-determined “others” succeeded in creating empathy in the viewer. This is 
a result of audiences “[empathizing] with the characters” through the film’s storytelling, 
encoding and decoding, and persuasiveness (13). Empathy communicated through film, 
discussing stories otherwise untold, is where cinema becomes a window looking out onto new 
worlds. This is putting a compassion-fuelled twist to Metz’s position of the ego between 
spectator and screen, taking the audiences gaze and directing them to otherwise overshadowed 
stories and persuading them to walk in their shoes. This is the power of the cinema that Benjamin 
spoke of — the ability to mobilize; however, this is not true of all cinema, nor of all viewers. 
 John Keefe in “The Film Spectator as “Bricoleur”’ explores both phenomenological and 
psychological approaches to film spectatorship as well as cinematic devices within a film (the 
camera, colour, mise en scène etc.) which are encoded with meaning, then decoded. In a later 
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section, Keefe unveils the “obverse of empathy and altruism” wherein “the fact of agency gives 
us power to behave inhumanely” (qtd. in Miller 102). This is where the power of the cinema is 
lost at the “departure from moral behaviour under religious, political or other ideological 
imperatives, under proclamations of righteousness” (102). While this is mentioned within the 
context of cinema violence and our aestheticization of it, this “[displacement] of imagination or 
denial within awareness” can also be applied to altruistic stories or scenes (102). Taking the dark 
side of one of Stuart Hall’s decoding positions, this individual agency can be applied to the 
oppositional approach which necessitates the viewer decode meaning then reform it according to 
their own ideology. In a world that has grown increasingly more hostile towards others, as well 
as more narcissistic, it would be ill-informed to not address the decrease in empathy on the 
whole — the denial within awareness— and the plausibility for its manifestation in the film 
spectator through the oppositional approach, but this has yet to be empirically assessed. Another 
dark side can also occur, with less hesitation, in the hegemonic and negotiated positions. For 
example, the article “A Dialogic Approach to Alien Movies” mentions the film Avatar (James 
Cameron, 2009) and “criticisms of its depiction of the Na’vi (the alien race) as Native 
American…[and] the “white messiah complex”’ (162). Yet, Benjamin Schrager, with a dialogical 
approach, emphasizes the benefits of this as an educational standpoint for students to understand 
the “political geography of imperialism” through aliens (163). When you cast the viewpoint on a 
story from a historically oppressive gaze, it is only educational if one were seeking 
reinforcement of the hegemonic position. Even though Schrager is aware of this issue, and takes 
time to point it out explicitly, using sources that paint the hegemonic position as beneficial are 
prime examples of active viewers that assimilate meaning into their preconceived ideologies, 
creating a “mirror,” if you will. This also weaponizes empathy because it is James Cameron’s 
choice to have the “white messiah” as the main character, with whom we are persuaded to 
empathize with and to not challenge beyond a negotiated approach. 
 Film has shown to succeed in garnering empathy in several instances, but how can 
empathy through cinematic exposure to new concepts, people, and ideas, win? Laura Mulvey 
states that it is man’s “castration anxiety” that begets the fetishization of women in film by the 
male, hegemonic gaze (qtd. in Durham 348). There are, of course, other hegemonic codes/ways 
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of seeing in the cinema (as seen with Avatar), but what lacks in all is a subversion of the 
established way of gazing. In rare instances there are films that go against the norm, but they are 
easily avoidable if one were to choose. How can empathy be instilled with such resistance? In a 
deceptively sharp turn, the article “Homeostasis and Soft Robotics in the Design of Feeling 
Machines” inquires about the “conditions that would potentially allow machines to care about 
what they do or think” (Man et al. 446). The idea is to “begin the design of these robots by, 
paradoxically, introducing vulnerability” (446). Building off of living beings’ state of 
homeostasis, imbuing a robot with vulnerability makes them not only aware of their own 
mortality and their need for survival, but also aware of others’ need to survive, too. This creates 
the seeds of empathy. If, say, film were to take the male gaze (among other gazes), cradle it, then 
castrate it, the hegemonic position would be in a state of vulnerability. In this vulnerability, those 
who benefited from this gaze may begin to understand and empathize with the other side. It 
could lead, for a brief moment, to eliminating the ego in looking as well as decoding outside the 
hegemonic position, and to politically mobilizing those who otherwise would have stared and 
watched. In essence, it is proven time and time again that films can be a tool to understand 
others, or to see a reflection of ourselves and our desires; but, for some spectators that mirror 
must be broken to reveal the window looking out onto the “new” world behind. 
 Cinema bears a unique ability to change peoples’ perceptions of the world in both an 
aural, visual, and (arguably) textual sense. By beginning with Walter Benjamin’s assertion for the 
cinema to mobilize the masses and Stuart Hall’s theories of the processes of encoding/decoding 
media, this established not only the power of a film to incite change as opposed to other art, but 
also the ways in which audiences respond to film and find meaning. This meaning can be 
assimilated into hegemonic codes or our own ideologies. Then, Christian Metz and 
psychoanalytical film theory cemented the importance of the gaze, the ego, and the screen 
working in conjunction to reveal a mirror of our own desires. Real-world studies were conducted 
regarding the degrees to which audiences empathized with characters in film, most notably films 
that portrayed minority groups, and these studies were successful and affective. This can reveal 
to audiences a “new” window on the world. That being said, empathy is never universal, and 
hostility or passivity breeds ignorance even when approaching new ideas in film and/or film 
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critique. Through taking Laura Mulvey’s application of castration anxiety (adopted from Freud), 
and synthesizing the formation of vulnerable soft machines, empathy can be created by utilizing 
the hegemonic gaze in a film, favouring it, then exposing it. This would, ideally, make viewers 
who are normally comfortable vulnerable and create empathy for the other. It should be 
recognized that this solution will likely fail in a broad setting (in many cases it already has), but 
as the world is exposed to more and more stories from different viewpoints everyday, and an 
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